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Abstract
Social preference research has received considerable attention in recent years.
Researchers have demonstrated that the presence of people with other-regarding
preferences can have important implications in many economic dimensions.
However, it is important to be aware of the fact that the empirical basis of
this literature relies to a large extent on experiments that do not provide
anonymity between experimenter and subject. It has been argued that this
lack of experimenter-subject anonymity may create selfish incentives to engage
in seemingly other-regarding behavior. If this were the case these experiments
would overestimate the importance of social preferences. Previous studies pro-
vide mixed results and methodological differences within and across studies make
it difficult to isolate the impact of experimenter-subject anonymity on prosocial
behavior. In this paper we use a novel procedure that allows us to examine the
impact of the exact same ceteris-paribus variation in anonymity on behavior in
three of the most commonly used games in the social preference literature. Our
data reveals that introducing experimenter-subject anonymity has only minor,
insignificant, effects on prosocial behavior.
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1 Introduction
Most laboratory experiments in economics lack experimenter-subject anonymity, i.e.,
the experimenter can link individual decisions to the identity of the subject. In this
paper we investigate whether the absence of experimenter-subject anonymity leads
to a systematic overstatement of the importance of social preferences. To this end
we develop novel experimental procedures that allow us to implement a clean ceteris-
paribus manipulation of experimenter-subject anonymity. We apply our procedure
to three of the most frequently used experimental games in the literature on social
preferences: the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the trust game. We find that
inducing experimenter-subject anonymity does not significantly affect the observed
extent of prosocial behavior in any of our three games.
To clarify the relevance of our results it is useful to start with some background and
motivation. Over the last two decades social preference research has developed into
one of the largest programs in behavioral economics (see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 2003;
Camerer, 2003; Cooper and Kagel, forthcoming, for extensive reviews of the literature).
Researchers have succeeded in integrating social preferences in game theoretic models1
and laboratory and field studies show that the presence of a significant fraction of people
with non-selfish preferences has crucial implications for various important dimensions
of economic activity. Examples comprise tax policies and public economics in general
(Bowles and Hwang, 2008; Ackert et al., 2009; Tyran and Sausgruber, 2006), contract
enforcement (Fehr et al., 1997; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006), wage formation and
relational contracting (Brown et al., 2004; Falk et al., 2006), public goods provision
(Andreoni, 1990, 1995; Fehr and Gaechter, 2000; Masclet and Villeval, 2008), or orga-
nizational economics (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1998; MacLeod, 2007; Ellingsen and
Johannesson, 2008; Fehr et al., 2011).
In light of the far reaching economic implications and policy consequences of social
preferences it is important to emphasize that the empirical foundation of this literature
is based to a large extent on laboratory experiments. This has raised the concern that
the effects of social preferences identified in the laboratory may not carry over to the
field. Recently, this problem has been the subject of an intensive methodological debate
about the role of laboratory experiments in economic research (see, e.g., Levitt and List,
2007; Falk and Heckman, 2009; List, 2009; Bardsley et al., 2010; Croson and Gaechter,
1Social preferences have been formalized in terms of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), fairness intention (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004;
Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), type-based reciprocity (Levine, 1998), preferences for social welfare
(Charness and Rabin, 2002), and concerns for social reputation or self-respect (Benabou and Tirole,
2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2007). These theories proved to be helpful in organizing the data
and have been applied to many important economic questions such as contract theory (Fehr et al.,
2007; Bartling and von Siemens, 2010), the role of fairness in the process of institution formation
(Kosfeld et al., 2009), the analysis of bargaining outcomes (Goeree and Holt, 2000), or the examination
of counterproductive incentive effects (Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2007,
2008).
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2010; Henrich et al., 2010). The most prominent arguments against the generalizability
of laboratory findings include concerns about low monetary stakes, self-selected student
participants, short examinations periods, and high degrees of scrutiny. We believe that
the best way of dealing with these issues is to rigorously investigate their empirical
relevance. Of course, we are not the first ones to make such an attempt. For some
aspects systematic evidence is already available. For example, there is a number of
studies consistently showing that higher monetary stakes do, in general, not eliminate
the role of social considerations. While there is some evidence that increasing the stakes
sometimes slightly reduces the extent of other-regarding behavior (see, e.g., Slonim
and Roth, 1998; Cherry et al., 2002; Carpenter et al., 2005), there is also evidence
that fairness concerns still play an important role even if experimental payoffs are
raised to the level of multiple monthly incomes (see, e.g., Cameron, 1999; Fehr et al.,
2002). Similarly, there is also considerable evidence illustrating that using students
as participants does not systematically overestimate the role of social preferences. A
number of subject pool comparisons suggests that, if anything, non-students tend to
exhibit even more prosocial behavior than students (see e.g., Fehr and List, 2004; Egas
and Riedl, 2008; Dohmen et al., 2008; Burks et al., 2009; Belot et al., 2010). In addition,
there are two recent papers that investigate selection effects and fail to find confirming
evidence for the hypothesis that students with stronger prosocial inclinations are more
likely to self-select into experiments (Cleave et al., 2010; Falk et al., 2010). The effect of
variations in scrutiny on other-regarding behavior has also been empirically investigated
in several papers before (see, in particular, Hoffman et al., 1994; Bolton and Zwick,
1995; Laury et al., 1995; Hoffman et al., 1996; Bolton et al., 1998; List et al., 2004;
Cox and Deck, 2005). However, as we will discuss in much more detail in section 2
the existing studies not only provide mixed results, but differences in experimental
procedures and games within and across studies make it difficult to get a coherent
overall picture of the results. The novel procedure introduced in this paper aims at
overcoming the problems that complicate the interpretation of these previous findings.
The reason why the lack of experimenter-subject anonymity in most economic ex-
periments may be problematic is that the feeling of being monitored and scrutinized
by the experimenter could induce subjects to change their normal behavioral patterns.
In particular, if subjects care what the experimenter thinks about them – be it, for
example, because they want to avoid a sense of social stigma associated with greedy
behavior or because they (irrationally) believe that being greedy may lead to exclu-
sion from future experiments – the lack of experimenter-subject anonymity may lead
to exaggeration of the importance of (seemingly) prosocial behavior. To the extent
to which the level of scrutiny inherent in the laboratory is higher than in the corre-
sponding field environment, lab studies may provide a biased picture of the relevance
of social preferences. For these reasons studying the effects of experimenter-subject
anonymity deserves a thorough empirical examination.
When we designed our experiments, our aim was to develop experimental proce-
dures that satisfy the following three principles:
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i) Ceteris-paribus variation of experimenter-subject anonymity
Previous studies often compare single-anonymous and double-anonymous treatments
that do not only differ with respect to the presence of experimenter-subject anonymity,
but also exhibit significant differences in decision making procedures (see, e.g., Hoffman
et al., 1994; Bolton and Zwick, 1995; Laury et al., 1995; Bolton et al., 1998; List et al.,
2004).2 This raises the problem that the additional differences in decision making
procedures may lead to an underestimation or overestimation of the anonymity effect.
In our experiments we make sure that the procedural details of the decision making
part of the experiment are identical across treatments. The only difference between
treatments is the payment procedure at the end of the experiment. However, even there
everything is identical except for the fact that participants in the single-anonymous
treatment need to write their name and sign a receipt which also contains their identity
number. As we announce the details of the payment procedure before the experiment,
this minimal but salient difference makes sure that participants in the single-anonymous
treatment understand from the outset that the experimenter can link their identity
number to their name. In the double-anonymous treatment instead the description of
the payment procedure ensures that participants realize that the experimenter has no
way to establish a link between their identity number and their name.
ii) Transparent and self-explanatory experimental procedures
Many previous studies make the subjects explicitly aware of the fact that the imple-
mented procedures ensure experimenter-subject anonymity (see, e.g., Hoffman et al.,
1994; Bolton and Zwick, 1995; Hoffman et al., 1996; Bolton et al., 1998). This may
induce undesirable demand effects as the emphasis of anonymity might result in sub-
jects inferring that the experimenter wants them to behave in a manner that might
be deemed unacceptable (see, e.g., Loewenstein, 1999, for a more detailed discussion).
Our experiments are designed in such a way that the explanation of the procedure itself
reveals the presence or absence of experimenter-subject anonymity. A manipulation
check that we performed after the experiment reveals that subjects understood the
anonymity condition.
iii) Flexible procedures suitable for different games
When identifying anonymity effects previous studies concentrate on one particular
game. As experimental procedures differ across studies, it is hard to determine whether
variations in results across games are caused by differences in the game structure or
differences in procedures. Our setup is flexible enough, so that we can use the exact
same procedures in all our games. This allows us to investigate in a clean way whether
anonymity effects differ across games.
We apply our procedure to three two-player games that are frequently used to mea-
2For example: In some studies actual money is placed in front of subjects in double-anonymous
treatments, while decision forms or payoff-cards are used in single-anonymous treatments. Other
studies put all subjects in one room in one treatments, but use several rooms in the other treatment.
For more details see section 2.
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sure social preferences: the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the trust game.
Overall, we have about 600 participants in our experiments, i.e., our results are based
on decisions of about 100 pairs in each game. Our main findings can be summarized as
follows: In the dictator game and the ultimatum game the presence of experimenter-
subject anonymity slightly lowers the offers made by dictators and proposers. However,
in both games the effects are small and not statistically significant.3 In the trust game
we do not find any effect on the trustors’ behavior, while we observe that experimenter-
subject anonymity reduces the repayments of the trustees. But again the effect is small
and not significant.4 These results suggest that the absence of experimenter-subject
anonymity in laboratory experiments has only minor, insignificant, effects on subjects’
behavior.
Our results are important for at least two reasons. First, our findings indicate
that observed prosocial behavior in the laboratory is not just an artifact of the lack of
experimenter-subject anonymity. This finding is important for the validity of many lab-
oratory experiments that measured social preferences. Second, our findings relieve the
experimenters from the burden of implementing double anonymous procedures because
the behavior under single anonymous procedures provides a very good approximation
of behavior under double anonymity. Ensuring experimenter-subject anonymity in-
evitably complicates procedures and severely limits the degrees of freedom in experi-
mental design. In particular, in computerized experiments it is very hard to credibly
guarantee complete anonymity towards the experimenter. Thus, knowing that the lack
of experimenter-subject anonymity does not lead to a significant change in prosocial
behavior, clears the way for many interesting future studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous
literature on anonymity effects. In section 3 we present the details of our procedures
and the design of the experiment. Section 4 reports our results and section 5 concludes.
2 Previous Literature
To clarify the role of our paper it is worthwhile to discuss the existing literature
in some detail. For convenience of expositon, we henceforth use the term “single-
anonymous” for experimental conditions without experimenter-subject anonymity and
the term “double-anonymous” for conditions with experimenter-subject anonymity.5
3In the dictator game dictators transfer 16 percent of their endowment when experimenter-subject
anonymity is present and 19 percent in its absence. In the ultimatum game proposers offer 42 percent
of their endowment in the presence of experimenter-subject anonymity and 43 percent otherwise.
4Trustors invest 63 percent of their endowment in both treatments. Trustees’ back transfers
amount to 15 percent of their available funds after having received the first mover transfer when
experimenter-subject anonymity prevails and 19 percent otherwise.
5Single-anonymous refers to the fact that the experiment only guarantees anonymity between
subjects, while double-anonymous experiments also provide anonymity between experimenter and
subject. In the previous literature some authors have used the terms “single-blind” and “double-
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Hoffman et al. (1994) is the first paper that investigates the impact of experimenter-
subject anonymity on prosocial behavior in an economic game. They compare single-
anonymous and double-anonymous treatments in a one-shot dictator game with an
endowment of $10. Their data reveals a large and significant difference in dictator
game outcomes across the two treatments. In the single-anonymous treatment only 18
percent of the offers were $0 with 32 percent offering $4 or more, while the double-
anonymous treatment resulted in 64 percent offers of $0, with only 8 percent offering
$4 or more.6 The authors conclude that their results indicate that “other-regarding
behavior is primarily an expectations phenomenon [...] rather than the result of an
autonomous private preference for equity” (Hoffman et al., 1994, page 348). However,
when interpreting these results it is crucial to take into account that the two treat-
ments compared in this study do not only differ with respect to experimenter-subject
anonymity, but there are also several procedural differences that might account for a
significant part of the difference. Two particularly important differences are the fol-
lowing: i) The verbal explanation of the game in the instructions is not identical: The
single-anonymous treatment uses a phrase suggesting that the dictator and his or her
counterpart “have been provisionally allocated” $10 and the task is to “divide” the
$10. This phrase has been removed in the double-anonymous treatment. ii) The deci-
sion procedure is very different: In the single-anonymous treatment dictators fill in a
form to decide about the allocation of the money. In the double-anonymous treatment
they actually get the dollar bills and physically transfer the money to the recipient. It
cannot be excluded that both these differences induce dictators to be more generous
in the single-anonymous treatment.
In fact, follow-up experiments reported in Hoffman et al. (1996) demonstrate that
the difference in behavior is much smaller when anonymity is manipulated in a way
that allows to keep the procedural details constant. This cleaner comparison yields
the following results: in the single-anonymous treatment 41 percent of dictators offer
$0, and 14 percent offer $4 or more, while the double-anonymous treatment yields
50 percent offers of $0 and 10 percent offers of $4 and more. This difference is no
longer statistically significant.7 In addition, it is also worthwhile to note that the
manipulation of anonymity in this experiment was rather extreme. In the double-
anonymous treatment each dictator received an envelope with 10 one-dollar bills and
10 paper slips. Each dictator had to take 10 items out of the envelope (any combination
of paper money and paper slips) and return the sealed envelope with the remaining
10 items to a box before leaving the experiment. In the single-anonymous treatment
each dictator had to bring his unsealed envelope to the experimenter who inspected the
content behind a cardboard wall. This personal and explicit revelation of the subject’s
blind” to make the same distinction. However, this terminology may cause misunderstandings as
in other scientific disciplines the term “double-blind” is typically used to describe a setup in which
neither the researcher nor the subject knows which treatment the subject received (e.g., placebo or
medication in clinical studies).
6These numbers refer to the FHSS R vs. DB1 comparison, see Hoffman et al. (1996) for details.
7These numbers refer to the SB1 vs. DB2 comparison, see Hoffman et al. (1996) for details.
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choice to the experimenter is rather unusual and is likely to induce strong feelings of
being scrutinized. Given these procedural peculiarities it is even more remarkable that
there is no significant difference between these treatments.
Bolton et al. (1998) report evidence from two treatments that essentially replicate
Hoffman et al.’s dictator game comparison. They do not find support for the hypothesis
that the implementation of experimenter-subject anonymity leads to less prosocial
behavior. In fact, dictators in the double-anonymous version of the game tend to
give more rather than less, but the effect is not statistically significant. However,
also in this study experimental procedures differ across treatments. Decisions in the
single-anonymous treatment are made by selecting a card out of a set of cards with
different payoff combinations. Decisions in the double-anonymous treatment are made
by placing actual money in a box. Whether and how these procedural changes affect
behavior is hard to tell and has not been systematically tested.
Effects of experimenter-subject anonymity in the ultimatum game have been inves-
tigated by Bolton and Zwick (1995). Using a series of 10 simplified (binary) versions of
the ultimatum game they find that outcomes consistent with the self-interest equilib-
rium (i.e., the proposer makes a selfish offers, which is accepted by the responder) are
significantly more likely in the double-anonymous version of their game (46 percent)
than in the single-anonymous version (39 percent). However, the authors of the study
also emphasize that “the anonymity hypothesis explains a relatively small fraction [...]
of the non-equilibrium play” (Bolton and Zwick, 1995, page 111). In addition, there
are again substantial differences in experimental procedures across treatments. In the
double-anonymous condition participants communicate their decisions using a com-
plex procedure which relies on selecting, sending and opening little boxes marked with
geometric symbols. The procedure ensures that the experimenter has no way of link-
ing individual decisions to specific participants. In the single-anonymous treatment the
complicated box procedure is replace with a much simpler system in which participants
can simply cut through cards showing geometric symbols to determine the payoffs.
Laury et al. (1995) conduct public good experiments with single- and double-
anonymous conditions using both inexperienced and experienced subjects. While ex-
perienced subjects contribute less of their endowment in the double-anonymous treat-
ment (37 percent) than in the single-anonymous treatment (43 percent), the opposite
is true for inexperienced subjects (double-anonymous: 53 percent / single-anonymous:
43 percent). However, none of these differences is statistically significant. Both treat-
ments were computerized raising the question of whether participants believed that
experimenter-subject anonymity was maintained. Being aware of this potential prob-
lem the authors distributed a brief questionnaire to experienced subjects after complet-
ing the double-anonymous experiment. All of them stated that they believed complete
privacy was maintained during the experiment. The computerized decision procedures
were held constant across treatments, but the seating of participants was different.
In the single-anonymous treatment all participants were placed in the same room, in
the double-anonymous treatment the participants were equally distributed across four
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rooms. While this ensured that members of the same group were spatially separated
in the double-anonymous treatment, the additional distance itself also constitutes a
difference that might have affected behavior.
List et al. (2004) examine whether the elicitation method affects responses in a
contingent valuation exercise.8 Respondents in the study are asked to vote “Yes” or
“No” on contributing $20 to provide start-up capital for a new Center for Environ-
mental Policy Analysis at the University of Central Florida. In one of their treatments
responses were elicited using standard techniques which imply that the experimenter
can observe each individual’s response. In another treatment they used a so-called
randomized response format, in which the experimenter knows the individual response
(“Yes” or“No”), but does not know whether it was to the question of interest, or to
an alternative innocuous question.9 The implementation of double-anonymity through
the randomized response format reduces the percentage of “Yes” votes from 38 to 20.
This difference is statistically significant. However, while this study convincingly illus-
trates that the choice of the elicitation method can significantly affect the outcome of
a contingent valuation exercise, it cannot be seen as a clean ceteris-paribus variation
of anonymity as usage of the randomized response format in the double-anonymous
treatment implies that the decision procedure differs substantially across treatments.
The impact of additional social distance between experimenter and subjects has also
been investigated for the trust game. The experiment of Cox and Deck (2005) includes
a single-anonymous and a double-anonymous treatment of a computerized, binary trust
game. While they do not detect any difference in first-mover behavior (in both treat-
ments 52 percent of the first movers decide to trust), they find that second-movers in
the double-anonymous treatment are significantly less likely to behave in a trustworthy
manner (the percentage of trustworthy decisions is 68 in the single-anonymous treat-
ment, but only 29 in the double-anonymous treatment). While this difference is large,
it is important to notice that the comparison of second-movers relies on a quite small
number of observations. The reason is that the double-anonymous treatment relies on
only 27 pairs (compared to 48 pairs in the single-anonymous treatment) and only 14
of the first movers decide to trust (if the first mover does not trust, the second mover
has no decision to make).
Overall, we feel that the current state of the literature makes it hard to draw con-
clusions about the impact of experimenter-subject anonymity on the observed degree
of prosocial behavior in the lab. The evidence is mixed and differences in experimental
procedures and games within and across studies hamper a clean interpretation. We
hope that our study helps to clarify the picture.
8Contingent valuation methods (or stated preference methods) are typically used to obtain value
measurements for nonmarketed goods or services (e.g., increased air or water quality).
9The data can be analyzed, because the researchers know the probability of getting the alternative
question and the probability of responding “Yes” to the alternative question.
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3 Design and Procedures
In this section we present the design and procedures of our experiment. We begin
with a short description of the three experimental games that we used to measure
the prosocial behavior of our participants. Subsequently, we explain the details of our
experimental protocol.
3.1 Experimental Games
All our games are simple two-player games that have repeatedly been used to study so-
cial preferences in the literature (see Camerer, 2003, for a survey). We have conducted
strict one-shot versions of each game, i.e., each subject makes one single decision and
all treatment comparisons are based on a between-subject design.
The first game that we implemented is the dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994).
In the dictator game one player (the dictator) has the possibility to allocate a given
sum of money between himself and another player (the recipient). After the dictator’s
allocation decision, the game is over, i.e., the recipient is completely passive and does
not make any decisions. In our case the dictator’s endowment was 20 Swiss Francs and
the transfer to the recipient could be any amount in steps of 2 Swiss Francs, i.e., 0, 2,
4, ..., or 20 Francs.
The second game that we used is the ultimatum game (Gueth et al., 1982). The
ultimatum game is identical to the dictator game except for the fact that the second
player (the responder) can now decide whether he would like to accept or reject the
offer of the first player (the proposer). Acceptance of the offer results in the payoffs
implied by the proposer’s allocation decision, rejection leads to payoffs of zero for both
players. The endowment and the strategy set of the first mover were the same as in
the dictator game.
As our third game we made use of the so called trust or investment game (Berg
et al., 1995). In our version of the game both the first mover (trustor) and the second
mover (trustee) receive an initial endowment of 10 Swiss Francs. The trustor can decide
how much of his endowment he wants to transfer to the trustee. Whatever amount the
trustor decides to transfer is tripled by the experimenter and given to the trustee. The
trustee observes the decision of the trustor and then decides how much money he wants
to pay back. The trustor’s transfer could be any integer amount up to 10 Swiss Francs,
and the trustee could repay any integer amount up to the sum of his endowment plus
the tripled transfer of the first mover.
In addition to their payments from the experiment each participant also received
a show-up fee of ten Swiss Francs. The subjects were informed about the show-up fee
on the first page of the written instructions to the experiment.
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3.2 Procedures
When we planned the procedural details of our experiments our main objective was
to avoid the problems that make conclusive inferences from the previous literature
difficult. In particular, our aim was to design a procedure that allows for a clean
ceteris-paribus variation of the experimenter-subject anonymity, is transparent and
self-explanatory, and can be applied to a number of different games. As computerized
experiments create a number of problems regarding experimenter-subject anonymity,
we decided to run the experiment with paper and pencil.10 All experiments were
carried out in a large lecture room with about 300 seats. To guarantee privacy we
restricted the recruitment to 30 participants per session. In total we conducted 26
sessions with 602 participants. All experiments were conducted by one experimenter
(Franziska Barmettler) and three assistants.
In the following we describe in much detail the procedures that we applied in all
our sessions. Steps 1 to 3 were identical in single- and double-anonymous treatments.
The only difference is in Step 4 (the payout system).
Step 1: Random determination of role in games
After the experimenter and assistant 1 had welcomed the participants in the waiting
hall in front of the lecture room, each of them had to draw an envelope out of a small
opening in an nontransparent fabric bag. The bag contained three types of envelopes:
red envelopes, blue envelopes and one white envelope. Subjects were informed that
those people who got a colored envelope (red or blue) would participate in the exper-
iment, while the person who got the white envelope would serve as a monitor who
supervises that the experiment follows exactly the pre-designed procedures. Subjects
with a red envelope were assigned to an individual workplace on the left side of the
lecture room, while subjects with a blue envelope were sent to one of the workplaces
on the right side of the room. All subjects were instructed not to open their envelope
until they were told to do so. The subject who received the white envelope (monitor)
was taken aside and received instructions from assistant 1.
Step 2: Instructions
When all subjects were seated, the experimenter instructed them to carefully read
a set of written instructions which was available at the workplace. The instructions
explained the payoffs structure, the experimental procedure and the payout system in
great detail (an English translation of our originally German instructions is reproduced
10An obvious problem is that computerized experiments make it hard to guarantee that the com-
puter does not record information that allows the experimenter to associate the decision with the
computer or seat number of the participant. Thus, even if participants do not reveal their names at
any point of the experiment, the experimenter may still have the chance to link decisions to faces.
There are arguably ways to mitigate this problem (e.g., by issuing a written guarantee of the researcher
or by showing the participants the code used to store the data), but all these potential solutions require
that the researcher emphasizes the presence of experimenter-subject anonymity. This goes against our
aim to limit the experimenter demand effect by having a self-explanatory procedure.
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in the appendix). At the end of the instructions the subjects were confronted with a
number of control questions about the payoff structure of the experiment. After all
participants had read the instructions and correctly answered the control questions,
the experimental procedure were once again explained with the help of an animated
slide show (the complete slide show is available on request). Possible questions about
the procedure were answered in private.
Step 3: Experimental Decisions
First, subjects were told to open their red or blue envelopes and to check that the
envelope contained two small cards with an identity number printed on them. The
arrangement of the seating ensured that nobody but the subject could see the identity
number. Then, subjects were told to put their identity cards back in the envelope.
At their workplaces each first mover (red envelopes) was provided with the following
items: a large yellow envelope, a small white envelope, a removable fastener, and a pen
with red ink. Second movers (blue envelopes) had been provided with a small white
envelope and a pen with blue ink at their workplace.
Now, the monitor distributed the decision forms (an English translation of the
originally German decision form is reproduced in the appendix). First movers were
asked to check the box corresponding to their decision on the form using the red ink
pen. Subsequently, first movers were told to place the decision form in the yellow
envelope. In addition, they were instructed to take one of their identity cards out of
the red envelope, place it in the white envelope, seal the white envelope, and also insert
it in the yellow envelope. Then, first movers were told to use the removable fastener to
seal the yellow envelope. Once all first movers had made their decisions, the monitor
came by and collected the yellow envelopes using a large cardboard box. The monitor
closed the box and shuffled the envelopes by turning and shaking the box.
Next, second movers were instructed to draw one of the yellow envelopes out of the
cardboard box, which the monitor brought to each individual workplace. The second
movers removed the decision sheet containing the decision of the first mover (written in
red ink) – while leaving the little white envelope with the identity card of the first mover
in the yellow envelope – and completed the decision sheet with his or her own decision
(written in blue ink).11 Then, they put the decision sheet back into the yellow envelope,
added a sealed white envelope containing one of their identity cards, and sealed the
yellow envelope. Finally, the monitor again collected all the yellow envelopes in the
large cardboard box and handed over the box to the experimenter. The experimenter
took the box, left the room, and went to an adjacent room to calculate the payoffs
with help of assistants 2 and 3. At this moment the participants started to work on a
post-experimental questionnaire (supervised by assistant 1 and the monitor).
Step 4: The Payout System
Up to this point the procedures in single- and double-anonymous treatments were com-
11In the dictator game there was no second movers decision. In these treatments the second movers
just looked at the first mover decision before they put it back into the yellow envelope.
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pletely identical. The variation in anonymity was introduced in the payout system. Of
course, the participants were aware of the respective payout system of their treatment
when they made their decisions. The payout system was explained in detail in the
written instructions and the animated slide show (see Step 1).
A) Double-Anonymous Payout System
In the double-anonymous treatments the experimenter took the decision sheets and
identity cards out of the envelopes, calculated the payoffs for both players, and placed
the corresponding amounts of money in stuffed envelopes labeled with the identity
numbers of the players.12 Note that it is impossible for the experimenter to link a
subject’s decision with the subject’s identity because only the subject knows his or her
identity number. Moreover, because the subjects know that their identity number is
private information they know that the experimenter cannot link their choices to their
identity. When all payout envelopes were prepared, the experimenter placed them on
a large table outside of the experiment room. Then the experimenter came back to the
experiment room. Next, the monitor left the experiment room and waited at the table
with the payout envelopes. The experimenter stayed with assistant 1 in the experiment
room. Assistant 1 sent the participants out of the experiment room one-by-one. Each
participant who arrived at the payout table took the remaining identity card out of his
colored envelope and gave it to the monitor. The monitor collected the identity card
and gave the participant the corresponding envelope.
This procedure ensures that nobody has the possibility to link names or faces to
payoffs. The monitor was not present when payoffs were calculated. Thus, he can only
link identity numbers to faces (people never mentioned their names during the exper-
iment), but he has no information about the link between identity numbers and pay-
offs. The experimenter and assistants were not involved in handing over the envelopes.
Thus, they can only link identity numbers to payoffs (this information is contained in
the yellow envelope), but they can never link identity numbers to names or faces. To
test whether participants’ understood the implications of the payout procedure, the
post-experimental questionnaire given to participants in the double-anonymous treat-
ments included the question of whether it was clear from our instructions that the
experimenter can never learn their personal decision. Subjects had to answer on a five
point scale (ranging from 1=“not clear at all” to 5=“absolutely clear”). Out of the
308 participants in these treatments 276 participants indicated 5 (absolutely clear), 20
participants indicated 4, and 2 participants indicated 3. This shows that the vast ma-
jority of the participants understood that the experimenter could not link their choices
to their personal identities.
B) Single-Anonymous Payout System
In the single-anonymous treatments the experimenter (and assistant 2 and 3) not only
stuffed the payout envelopes, but they also prepared an individual receipt for each par-
12The stuffed envelopes make it impossible to guess the amount of money in the envelope based on
the thickness of the envelope.
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ticipant. The receipt displayed the identity number of the participant together with the
earned amount of money. In these treatments only assistant 1 and the monitor stayed
in the experiment room during the payout procedure, while the experimenter remained
at the payout table. After the participants had handed over their identity number to
the experimenter, the experimenter asked them to add their name and signature to the
receipt before they received their envelope. As the participants know that the experi-
menter can always link decisions and identity numbers (from the information contained
in the yellow envelope), the explicit link between identity number, name, and payoff
on the receipt implies that the experimenter can directly link a participants identity
to his or her decisions.
4 Results
In this section we report our results. We discuss whether and how the presence of
experimenter-subject anonymity affects the behavior of participants in the dictator
game, the ultimatum game and the trust game.
4.1 Main Findings
Overall, we had 602 participants in our experiments. Each participant participated
in exactly one experimental condition. We have observations from 103 pairs in the
dictator game, 100 pairs in the ultimatum game, and 98 pairs in the trust game.
In each game about half of the pairs took part in a condition with experimenter-
subject anonymity (double-anonymity) and the other half of the pairs took part in
a condition without experimenter-subject anonymity (single-anonymity). In total, we
conducted 26 experimental sessions (i.e., about 23 subjects per session on average).13
Treatments (type of game and anonymity condition) were randomly allocated to the
different sessions of the experiment.
We first discuss the results of the dictator game. The first two rows of Table 1 show
mean and median dictator transfers in the single- and double-anonymous treatment.
In addition, the table also reports the relative frequencies of dictator behavior com-
patible with the self-interest equilibrium (selfish) and the desire to reach an efficient
equal split of payoffs (fair/trust).14 In the single-anonymous treatment the average
13The largest sessions had 28 participants. Of the 26 sessions 24 took place with at least 16 subjects.
In the other two sessions low recruitment turnout and high no-show rates lead to a smaller number
of participants (10 and 8 participants, respectively). The reported results are based on a data set
including the two “small” sessions. However, removing these observations does not affect any of our
results.
14A model based on common knowledge of pure self-interest predicts that first movers transfer
CHF 0 in the dictator game and trust game and CHF 0 or CHF 2 in the ultimatum game. A desire
to reach an efficient equal split implies that first mover transfers need to be equal to 10 in all three
games.
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(median) dictator transfer amounts to CHF 3.9 (CHF 4) and we observe that 36.7 per-
cent of dictators do not transfer any money to the recipient. In the double-anonymous
treatment the average (median) dictator transfers drops to CHF 3.3 (CHF 2) and the
fraction of dictators who transfer CHF 0 increases to 42 percent. The histogram of dic-
tator transfers displayed in Panel A of Figure 1 graphically confirms the presence of a
slight tendency to make smaller dictator transfers in the presence of double anonymity.
However, Table 2 reveals that the observed difference is not statistically significant.
Column (1) reports a simple OLS estimation in which we regress dictator transfers on
a dummy variable which takes on value 1 if the observation comes from the treatment
with double-anonymity and is equal to 0 otherwise. The coefficient of the double-
anonymity variable is negative, but far from significant (p-value = 0.373, calculated
on the basis of robust standard errors). It is also noteworthy that the transfer levels
of both treatments are fully in line with the well established fact that dictators are
typically willing to give 15 to 20 percent of their endowment to the recipients (see, e.g.,
Camerer, 2003, for a detailed review).
Second, we present the results of the ultimatum game. Rows 3 and 4 of Table 1
show that proposer behavior in the ultimatum game is remarkably stable across treat-
ments. While the average proposer transfer is slightly lower in the double-anonymous
treatment (CHF 8.3) than in the single-anonymous treatment (CHF 8.6), the medians
are identical (CHF 8). Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates that also the distributions of
proposer transfers in the two treatments are very similar. In both treatments we do
not have a single proposer in the data set who behaves in accordance with the self-
interest prediction (i.e., no proposer transfers CHF 0 or CHF 2 in either treatment).
There are two proposers who make a transfer of CHF 4 (one in each treatment), all
the others transfer CHF 6 or more. In fact, as in many other ultimatum game experi-
ments in the literature (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003, p. 48 ff., for details), the equal split
(CHF 10) is the most frequently observed offer (the relative frequencies of equal-split
offers are 37.7 percent (single-anonymous) and 38.3 percent (double-anonymous), see
the final column of Table 1). The strong increase in proposer offers in the ultimatum
game relative to dictator transfers is in line with previous findings and reflects the fact
that proposers anticipate that a substantial fraction of second movers might reject low
offers. The regression analysis displayed in Column (2) of Table 2 confirms that there
is no significant difference in proposer behavior across the two treatments (p-value =
0.606, calculated on the basis of robust standard errors).
We now turn to responder behavior in our ultimatum game. As we use the direct
elicitation method and first mover transfers are quite high (the vast majority of pro-
posers transfer at least 30 percent of their endowment, see Panel B of Figure 1), we do
not observe many second mover rejections. In fact, only 3 of the 100 responders in our
data set reject the proposer’s offer (one in the single- and two in the double-anonymous
treatment). Low rejection rates are not unusual in ultimatum games using the direct
elicitation method (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003, p. 48-49, for a brief discussion). Existing
data about rejection patterns in ultimatum games comes mostly from studies using
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the contingent response method (aka the strategy method). Needless to say that with
this data no statistical test finds a significant difference in responder behavior across
treatments.
Finally, we report the results of the trust game. The bottom two rows of Table 1
show that average trustor transfers are identical (CHF 6.3) across treatments, while
the median transfer is even slightly higher in the double-anonymous-treatment (CHF 8
compared to CHF 7). Furthermore, the table and Panel C of Figure 1 also reveals that
trustors in the double-anonymous treatment are somewhat more likely to transfer CHF
0 (selfish) and CHF 10 (full trust). However, as in the other two games the regression
analysis (Column (3) of Table 2) shows that there is no statistically significant difference
between first mover transfers across treatments (p = 0.945, calculated on the basis of
robust standard errors).
Second mover behavior in the trust game is summarized in Panel D of Figure 1.
The figure, which displays average trustee repayments conditional on trustor transfers,
does not reveal obvious, systematic differences across treatments. This impression
is statistically confirmed by regressing trustee repayments on a dummy for double-
anonymity and controlling for trustor transfers (Column (4) of Table 2). The regression
analysis reveals that repayments tend be lower in the presence of double anonymity,
but the effect is again not statistically significant (p = 0.345, calculated on the basis
of robust standard errors). Furthermore, our data also replicate the common finding
that positive trustor investments are, on average, just on the verge of being profitable
(see, e.g., Camerer, 2003, for details). Trustors who make a positive investment gain,
on average, CHF 0.35 in the single-anonymous treatment and lose, on average, CHF
0.67 in the double-anonymous treatment. Also this difference is far away from being
statistically significant (p = 0.438, calculated on the basis of robust standard errors).
To summarize: In all three games participants’ behavior is fully in line with previ-
ously observed behavior in these games. The presence of double anonymity does not
significantly affect behavior in any game.
4.2 Statistical Robustness
So far, our statistical analysis is exclusively based on simple comparisons of average
transfers using OLS-estimations with robust standard errors. In the following we apply
a number of additional tests to demonstrate that our results do not change, if we use
methods which take potential problems of the OLS-estimator into account. First, it is
well known that the presence of outliers in the data set can distort the OLS estimator
and lead to unreliable results. The histograms in Figure 1 show that we have a number
of outliers in our data set, in particular in the dictator and ultimatum game (e.g.,
some dictators/proposer transfer up to 80 percent of their endowment). In order to
control for that we repeat all our estimations using robust regression.15 The results of
15See http://www.stata.com/help.cgi?rreg for technical details.
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these estimations are reported in columns (1) to (4) of Table 3. While the size of some
coefficients changes somewhat (e.g., in the dictator game), the non-significance of all
our results is unaffected.16
Second, the experimental design implies that all our dependent variables are po-
tentially affected by censoring.17 To account for this we present Tobit estimations in
columns (5) to (8) of Table 3. Not surprisingly, using Tobit estimations mostly affects
the coefficient in the regressions relating to the trust game (see columns (7) and (8)).
The reason is that we have substantial fractions of trustors choosing transfers of either
CHF 0 or CHF 10 and substantial fractions of trustees choosing repayments of CHF
0 in both treatments (see also Table 1 and Figure 1). However, again all treatment
comparisons yield insignificant results.18
Finally, we also perform two non-parametric tests on our first mover data: the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
Both tests do not yield any significant differences between treatments in any game.19
4.3 Discussion
Our study reports ceteris-paribus comparisons between treatments with and without
experimenter-subject anonymity for the dictator game, ultimatum game, and trust
game. To put our results into perspective, we find it useful to compare our findings
with the results of studies which use the same games, but manipulate another important
aspect of anonymity in experiments: the subject-subject anonymity. For the dictator
game there are two studies that are of particular interest in this context. First, Bohnet
and Frey (1999) completely eliminate subject-subject anonymity in a dictator game.
They compare a standard single-anonymous dictator game with a treatment in which
matched pairs were asked to stand up and look at each other for a couple of seconds
before entering the decision stage. Their results reveal that eliminating subject-subject
anonymity has a large impact on dictator giving. While dictators in the baseline
condition made average transfers of 26 percent of their endowment to the recipient,
average transfers of dictators in the two-way identification treatment amounted to 50
percent of their endowment. This difference is highly significant (p < 0.01, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test). Second, Lazear et al. (2011) push the anonymity of dictators to the
extreme. They introduce a treatment, in which the recipient did not even know of the
existence of a dictator at the beginning of the experiment. The recipient only learned
16The p-values corresponding to the coefficient for the double-anonymity dummy are as follows (by
column): (1) p = 0.244 / (2) p = 0.689 / (3) p = 0.926 / (4) p = 0.457.
17The strategy set of first movers is either limited to {0, 2, 4, ..., 20} (dictator and ultimatum
game) or to {0, 1, 4, ..., 10} (trust game) and second mover repayments in the trust game can only
be in the range {0, 1, 2, ..., 40}.
18The p-values corresponding to the coefficient for the double-anonymity dummy are as follows (by
column): (1) p = 0.399 / (2) p = 0.604 / (3) p = 0.805 / (4) p = 0.141.
19The corresponding p-values are as follows (ksmirnov/ranksum): dictator game (0.285/0.300 ) /
ultimatum game (1.000/0.700 ) / trust game (0.997/0.816).
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about the dictator game if the dictator chose to enter the game. Otherwise, the dictator
kept his full endowment and the recipient never got to know that the dictator would
have had the opportunity to transfer money to him. The control condition is a standard
single-anonymous dictator game in which everybody is informed about the game right
at the beginning of the experiment. The experiment was conducted in two different
locations. In one location the presence of the possibility to not enter the game lowers
average dictator transfers from 19 percent of the endowment to 6 percent, and in the
other location from 20 percent to 12 percent. Both decreases are statistically significant
(p = 0.02, p < 0.001; Wilcoxon rank-sum tests).
There are also ultimatum game studies which manipulate the degree of subject-
subject anonymity. Roth (1995) compares a standard ultimatum game treatment to
a treatment in which participants have a chance to engage in face-to-face communica-
tion for two minutes. The communication phase took place before the subjects knew
the rules of the experiment, i.e., strategic communication to directly influence the
other player’s behavior was not possible. They find that eliminating subject-subject
anonymity through face-to-face communication increases average proposer transfers
from 43 percent to 47 percent of the endowment. The fraction of offers around the
equal split (i.e., 45 – 55 percent of the endowment) increased from 50 percent in the
baseline treatment to 82 percent in the communication treatment. At the same time
(and certainly related to the increase in offers) the rejection rate dropped from 33 per-
cent to 6 percent. Schmidt and Zultan (2005) replicate Roth’s experiment with video
conferencing instead of face-to-face communication. They find that the elimination
of subject-subject anonymity increases average proposer offers from 35 percent to 45
percent, while the rejection rate was reduced from 13 percent to 3 percent. Both effects
are highly significant (p < 0.01, p < 0.01; Wilcoxon rank-sum tests).
We are not aware of a study that reports a clean ceteris-paribus comparison of
behavior in trust games with and without subject-subject anonymity, but Glaeser et al.
(2000) conduct a trust game in which the subjects meet the person with whom they are
matched before the game is played. The experiment is based on the design of Berg et al.
(1995). However, since the author were worried that the absence of subject-subject
anonymity would increase cooperation in the trust game so strongly that variation
in trusting behavior would be eliminated, they reduced the incentive to cooperate by
only doubling rather than tripling the money sent by the trustor. Despite the reduced
investment incentive Glaeser et al. (2000) find that trustors invest 83 percent of their
endowment, while trustors in Berg et al. (1995) only transfer about 50 percent of their
endowment. In addition, while trustees repayments in Glaeser et al. (2000) amount
to about 45 percent of their available funds, trustees in Berg et al. (1995) repay only
about 32 percent of their available funds.20
20This implies that the level of repayments was almost identical in the two experiments despite the
difference in the multiplier of trustor investments. In Glaeser et al. (2000) trustees repay on average
about 90 percent of the trustor investment, in Berg et al. (1995) they repay about 95 percent of the
investment.
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These results indicate that anonymity with respect to other subjects has an impor-
tant influence on decisions in all three games. More anonymity leads to substantial
decreases in the amount transferred by first movers in all three games and there is
also a significant impact on second mover behavior in the ultimatum game and the
trust game. Relative to these findings our results reveal that anonymity with respect
to the experimenter is of much lower importance. Introducing experimenter-subject
anonymity decreases average dictator transfers from 19 percent of the endowment to
16 percent, decreases average proposer transfers from 43 percent of the endowment to
42 percent, does not affect average trustor investments, and decreases average trustee
repayments from 19 percent of their available funds to 15 percent. In comparison to
the changes induced by manipulations of subject-subject anonymity described above
all these effects are small and none of them reaches a conventional level of significance.
5 Conclusions
The existing evidence on the impact of experimenter-subject anonymity on prosocial
behavior in laboratory experiments is hard to interpret as differences in experimental
procedures and games within and across studies make it difficult to derive a coherent
overall conclusion from the results. In this paper we move a step forward and develop a
novel experimental procedure which is transparent and self-explanatory and allows for
a clean ceteris-paribus variation of anonymity in several games. Using these procedures
we investigate whether the presence of double anonymity leads to a systematic change
in prosocial behavior in three of the most often used laboratory experiments to measure
social preferences. We find that the variation of anonymity does not significantly affect
behavior in the dictator game, the ultimatum game, or the trust game. In addition,
we observe that the behavior of our participants replicates previously reported results
in experiments using the same games.
We think that our results are interesting for at least two reasons. First, our findings
show that observed prosocial behavior in laboratory experiments cannot be denounced
as being just an artifact of the lack of experimenter-subject anonymity. This is impor-
tant as the empirical basis of the whole literature on social preferences mostly relies
on laboratory results. Second, our findings provide useful information for researchers
using laboratory experiments. Ensuring experimenter-subject anonymity inevitably
complicates procedures and severely limits the degrees of freedom in experimental de-
sign. Thus, knowing that the lack of experimenter-subject anonymity does not lead
to a significant increase in (seemingly) prosocial behavior, clears the way for many
interesting future studies.
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Table 1: Comparison of first mover transfers
Experiment Anonymity N(pairs) Mean Median Selfish Fair/Trust
(in %) (in %)
Dictator Single 49 3.9 4 36.7 12.2
Double 54 3.3 2 42.6 14.8
Ultimatum Single 53 8.6 8 0 37.7
Double 47 8.3 8 0 38.3
Trust Single 45 6.3 7 17.8 35.6
Double 53 6.3 8 20.8 43.4
Notes: The endowment of first movers in the dictator and the ultimatum game is CHF 20.
In the trust game both players get and endowment of CHF 10. The last two columns report
the relative frequencies of decisions which are compatible with the self-interest equilibrium
(selfish) and the desire to reach an efficient equal split of payoffs (Fair/Trust), respectively
(see Footnote 14 for details).
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Table 2: Comparison of first and second mover transfers across treatments
Dependent variable DG (fm) UG (fm) TG (fm) TG (sm)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Double anonymity -0.659 -0.226 0.0541 -1.014
(0.736) (0.436) (0.789) (1.067)
First mover transfer 1.081***
(0.120)
Constant 3.918*** 8.566*** 6.267*** -0.194
(0.511) (0.316) (0.567) (0.731)
Observations 103 100 98 98
R2 0.008 0.003 0.000 0.393
Notes: OLS estimations with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variables in columns (1) to (3) are the first mover transfers in the dictator game (DG),
ultimatum game (UG) and trust game (TG). The dependent variable in column (4) is
second mover repayments in the trust game. ***indicates significance at the 1-percent
level, ** indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and * indicates significance at the
10-percent level.
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Figure 1: Overview of decisions
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Notes: Panels A to C show histograms of first mover decisions in the dictator, ultimatum,
and trust games. Panel D displays average second mover repayments conditional on received
first mover transfers in the trust game. The dotted line represents the break-even frontier
for first mover investments (i.e., average second mover repayment = first mover transfer).
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A Complete Instructions for First Movers in the
Ultimatum Game
The following is an English translation of our originally German instructions. The
German instructions are available from the authors on request. We reproduce the
instructions for Participant A in the ultimatum game. The instructions for Participant
B and other games are very similar. We make explicit which parts differ between single-
and double anonymous conditions.
General Instructions for Participant A
Thank you very much for your participation in this scientific study. Please read the
following explanations carefully. If you have questions, please raise your hand and the
experimenter will come to you.
This set of instructions is exclusively for your personal use. During the experiment any
form of communication with other participants is strictly prohibited. Non-observance
of this rule results in exclusion from the experiment and all payments.
You receive a fixed amount of 10 Francs for the participation in this experiment. In
addition, you have the opportunity to earn more money which is added to this fixed
amount. How much additional money you earn depends on your decision and the
decision of another participant in the experiment.
At the end of the experiment you receive the amount of money earned in the experiment
plus the fixed amount of 10 Francs in cash.
In the following we provide you with a detailed explanation of the procedures of the
experiment.
The Experiment
There are two types of participants in this experiment: Participants A and Participants
B. Each Participant A is paired with a Participant B.
You are in the role of Participant A for the whole duration of the study.
All participants in the role of Participant A are seated on the same side of the room
as you. People in the role of Participant B are seated on the other side of the room.
The Participant B with whom you will be paired in the experiment will be determined
randomly during the experiment. You will never be informed about the identity of
the Participant B with whom you are paired and Participant B will never be informed
about your identity.
On the following page we describe in detail the decisions which you can make during
the upcoming experiment.
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The Decision Situation
The starting point
Both Participant A and Participant B have to make a decision in this experiment. Par-
ticipant A makes his decision first. As Participant A you receive an initial endowment
of 20 Francs. Participant B does not receive an endowment.
Phase 1: Your decision
As Participant A you have to decide how much of your endowment you would like
to transfer to the Participant B who has been assigned to you. You can transfer any
even-numbered integer amount between 0 and 20 Francs. In other words you can
transfer 0 Francs, 2 Francs, 4 Francs, 6 Francs, ..., up to 20 Francs.
Phase 2: Participant B’s decision
After you have made your transfer decision, Participant B can make his decision.
Participant B has the possibility to accept your transfer or to reject your transfer. If
Participant B decides to accept the transfer, he or she receives the transferred money,
and you keep the rest of your endowment. If he or she decides to reject the transfer
you and Participant B receive no money.
Phase 3: Determination of incomes
After Participant B has made his or her decision, all decisions have been made and
your income and Participant B’s income can be calculated.
Your income
If Participant B accepts your transfer, your income is determined as follows: You
receive your endowment of 20 Francs minus your transfer to Participant B.
If Participant B rejects your transfer, your income is zero.
If B accepts: Your income = Endowment – Transfer to B
If B rejects: Your income = 0
Participant B’s income
If Participant B accepts your transfer, his or her income is equal to your transfer to B.
If Participant B rejects your transfer, his or her income is zero.
If B accepts: Income of B = Transfer to B
If B rejects: Income of B = 0
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Procedural Details
At the beginning of the experiment a participant has been selected to assist the exper-
imenter during the experiment and to supervise that all steps of the experiment follow
the predetermined rules stated in these instructions. This participant is henceforth
called the “helper”.
Each participant in the experiment has randomly drawn an envelope in the begin-
ning. Participants who have drawn a red envelope are in the role of Participant
A, participants who have drawn a blue envelope are in the role of Participant B.
Your red envelope contains two small cards with your anonymous three digit identity
number. Since you have drawn your envelope randomly no other participant knows
your anonymous identity number. Please do not yet open your red envelope. The
experimenter will later ask you to open the envelope.
Participant A’s Decision
You can indicate your decision on a decision sheet that will be distributed after all par-
ticipants have completed reading the instructions. On the decision sheet you indicate
the amount of money that you are willing to transfer to Participant B by checking the
corresponding box. When you have made your decision, please put the decision sheet
into the yellow decision envelope which you find at your workplace. In addition, please
put one of your small identity cards contained in your red envelope into the small
white envelope which you also find at your workplace. Then, please seal the small
white envelope and also put it into the yellow envelope. Finally, please close the yellow
envelope with the removable fastener, so that nothing can fall out of the envelope.
When all Participants A have made their decisions, the helper will collect all yellow
envelopes in a box. After the helper has carefully shuffled the envelopes, each Partici-
pant B will draw a yellow envelope out of the box. On instruction of the experimenter
participants B will then remove the decision sheet with the decision of Participant A
from the yellow envelope. When removing the decision sheet, Participants B will be
instructed to make sure that the small white envelope containing the identity number
of Participant A remains in the yellow envelope. The helper will ensure that no
Participant B ever open a white envelope.
Participant B’s Decision
Participant B can now see how much you as Participant A have transferred to him. Af-
ter inspecting the decision sheet, Participant B indicates on the decision sheet whether
he would like to accept or reject your transfer. Then, Participant B returns the de-
cision sheet into the yellow envelope, puts one of his or her own small identity cards
into another small white envelope, seals the white envelope and adds it to the rest of
the material in the yellow envelope. Finally, participant B reattaches the removable
fastener and closes the yellow envelope, so that nothing can fall out.
After all Participants B have made their decision, the helper again collects all yellow
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envelopes in the box. Subsequently, the helper hands over the box to the experimenter.
The experimenter takes the box to a small room adjacent to the experiment room and
calculates the monetary payoffs of participants based on the decisions contained in the
yellow envelopes. The helper stays in the lecture room during this time.
***The following paragraphs were only included in the single-anonymity condition***
Calculation of Payoffs
Each yellow envelope contains the decision sheet containing the decisions of Partic-
ipant A and Participant B. This allows the experimenter to calculate the payoff of
Participants A and B. As soon as the payoffs are calculated the experimenter puts
the money earned by Participant A (including the fixed amount of 10 Francs for
participation) in a white payout envelope and marks the envelope with the identity
number of Player A. The money earned by Participant B (including the fixed amount
of 10 Francs for participation) is being put in another white payout envelope which is
marked with the identity number of Participant B. In addition to preparing the payout
envelopes, the experimenter also prepares a personal receipt for each participant.
The receipt contains the identity number of the participant and indicates the earned
amount of money. When the participant collects the money, he has to add his name
on the form and sign it.
Payout Procedure
As soon as all payout envelopes have been prepared, the experimenter places the en-
velopes ordered by identity number on a table outside of the lecture room. All envelopes
are stuffed, so that it is impossible to see how much money is in there from the outside.
The experimenter then goes to the payout table and participants can pick up their
money one-on-one. Each participant receives his payout envelope in privacy. When
picking up his or her envelope every participant hands over the second small identity
card to the experimenter. Then the experimenter will ask the participant to add his or
her name on the receipt and to sign it. As soon as all participants have received their
envelope the experiment is over.
If you have any questions regarding the procedures of this experiment, please raise
your hand. The experimenter will then come to your workplace and answer your
question in privacy.
***The following paragraphs were only included in the double-anonymity condition***
Calculation of Payoffs
Each yellow envelope contains the decision sheet containing the decisions of Partic-
ipant A and Participant B. This allows the experimenter to calculate the payoff of
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Participants A and B. As soon as the payoffs are calculated the experimenter puts
the money earned by Participant A (including the fixed amount of 10 Francs for
participation) in a white payout envelope and marks the envelope with the identity
number of Player A. The money earned by Participant B (including the fixed amount
of 10 Francs for participation) is being put in another white payout envelope which is
marked with the identity number of Participant B. The experimenter does not know
which identity number belongs to which participant.
Payout Procedure
As soon as all payout envelopes have been prepared, the experimenter places the en-
velopes ordered by identity number on a table outside of the lecture room. Then the
experimenter returns to the lecture room. All envelopes are stuffed, so that it is impos-
sible to see how much money is in there from the outside. The helper then goes to the
payout table and participants can pick up their money one-on-one. Each participant
receives his payout envelope in privacy. When picking up his or her envelope every
participant hands over the second small identity card to the helper, so that the helper
can ensure that the participant takes the correct envelope. As soon as all participants
have received their envelope the experiment is over.
If you have any questions regarding the procedures of this experiment, please raise your
hand. The experimenter will then come to your workplace and answer your question
in privacy.
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Control Questions
Please answer the following control questions. Please write down how you calculate
the payoffs. If you have questions, please raise your hand, to call the experimenter.
Once you have completed all questions, please raise your hand. The experimenter will
then join you at your work place to control your answers.
The purpose of these questions is to check whether all participants completely
understand the rules of the experiment. Wrong answers do not have any consequences
for your monetary payoffs in the experiment.
Question 1:
You transfer 10 Francs to Particpant B and he or she accepts your transfer.
Your income: .......................
Particpant B’s income: .......................
Question 2:
You transfer 0 Francs to Particpant B and he or she rejects.
Your income: .......................
Particpant B’s income: .......................
Question 3:
You transfer 2 Francs to Particpant B and he or she accepts your transfer.
Your income: .......................
Particpant B’s income: .......................
Question 4:
You transfer 8 Francs to Particpant B and he or she rejects.
Your income: .......................
Particpant B’s income: .......................
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Decision Sheet for Participant A and Participant B
Participant A: Please check the box corresponding to your transfer decision in the
first column.
Participant B: Please use the right-hand side to indicate whether you would like to
accept or reject the transfer by checking the corresponding box.
Participant A’s Decision
Please check a
box!
Participant A’s
transfer
2 0
2 2 Participant B’s Decision
2 4
2 6 I accept the transfer 2
2 8
2 10 I reject the transfer 2
2 12
2 14
2 16
2 18
2 20
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